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ABSTRACT 
Physical Security Assessment of a Regional University Computer Network 
by 
Nathan Timbs 
 
Assessing a network's physical security is an essential step in securing its data. This document 
describes the design, implementation, and validation of PSATool, a prototype application for 
assessing the physical security of a network's intermediate distribution frames, or IDFs (a.k.a. 
"wiring closets"). PSATool was created to address a lack of tools for IDF assessment. It 
implements a checklist-based protocol for assessing compliance with 52 security requirements 
compiled from federal and international standards. This checklist can be extended according to 
organizational needs. 
 
PSATool was validated by using it to assess physical security at 135 IDFs at East Tennessee 
State University. PSATool exposed 95 threats, hazards, and vulnerabilities in 82 IDFs. A control 
was recommended for each threat, hazard, and vulnerability discovered. The administrators of 
ETSU's network concluded that PSATool's results agreed with their informal sense of these 
IDFs' physical security, while providing documented support for improvements to IDF security. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The number of computer networks continues to increase as computing becomes more 
distributed and decentralized. Increased dependence on networked computer systems as 
infrastructure involves risks that continually emerge and evolve (Kairab, 2005). Security controls 
are intended to reduce these risks. These controls involve constraints on the deployment and use 
of equipment, policy, and procedure.  
Physical security controls, security controls intended to protect material assets and 
operating environments, are essential to network operation and protection (Pholi, 2003). These 
controls include security alarms, fire alarms, and entry control systems, as well as power backup 
and environmental monitoring systems, including temperature and humidity control systems 
(Richards, 1982). Proper control implementation is essential to assure the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of information assets (Stoneburner, Goguen, & Feringa, 2002). 
Physical security controls, like other mechanisms for assuring network and information 
security, can be difficult to implement. Defending assets from all potential threats by all 
conceivable attackers and means of attack is impractical (Johnston & Garcia, 2002). Justifying 
costs and measuring performance is difficult, due to the difficulty of identifying attempts at 
attacks and correlating thwarted attempts with specific defenses and potential damage. Security 
and support processes tend to be reactive in that system hardening is usually undertaken as a 
specific response to a specific security incident (Johnston & Garcia, 2002).  
One common approach for securing assets uses government regulations and best 
practices as a basis for selecting controls. This work is concerned with the use of this approach to 
select and assess network-related physical security controls in university information systems. 
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These assets include student and employee financial, academic, and healthcare records, which 
universities manage as a matter of routine. The privacy and security of these records is governed 
by State and Federal regulations, including the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA) and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). These regulations 
mandate that sensitive information that a network hosts be secured against unauthorized access. 
Network-enabled services provided by universities that can expose sensitive information 
to unauthorized access include e-mail, Internet access, and network data storage. A typical 
campus network allows a university's students, administrators, and faculty to access these 
services via hard-wired Ethernet connections. These connections require cabling from each 
user’s computer to a device, known as a switch, that links its users to the campus network. 
Switches and their support equipment are often housed in wiring closets, or intermediate 
distribution frames (IDFs). Usually found in at least one location on each floor of a building, 
IDFs contain equipment racks filled with networking switches, patch cables, power supplies, and 
fiber optics that connect to a main distribution frame (MDF). The MDF typically connects an 
entire building to a server room or data center (Cisco Systems, Inc., 2004).  
Switches and other forms of network equipment are vulnerable to many modes of 
physical attack. Whether deliberate or unintended, physical access to network equipment can 
result in equipment and service loss. An attacker in close proximity to a network can record and 
interpret the electronic signals radiated by an operating network. Physical access to network 
hardware can permit electronic eavesdropping through the use of a protocol analyzer. Physical 
access can allow network services to be disrupted by flooding the network with traffic.  
Physical security controls can reduce the risk associated with these types of attacks. 
These controls, however, are an often overlooked component of network and information 
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security (Pholi, 2003). While many well-known tools like Saint (2013), NTOSpider (2013), and 
Nessus (2013) support the assessment of electronic security and discovery of cyber vulnerability, 
there are few physical security assessment tools designed to record, evaluate, and compare the 
state of physical security controls of IDF’s to physical security standards and best practices. 
Tools incorporating physical security assessment based on individual standards exist, e.g., SANS 
BS/ISO/IEC 17799 Checklist (Thiagarajan, 2006). However, an Internet search including the 
online literature databases of the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) and the Institute 
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) performed for this research returned no tools 
based on multiple information security standards. Likewise, a search returned no tools devoted 
exclusively to IDF physical security assessments.  
The research described in this thesis focused on the creation of a sound, practical, and 
effective tool for assessing the physical security of IDFs. IDFs have historically received much 
less attention than MDFs, even though they are the most common type of network installation, 
and their compromise presents a serious risk to data security. The work's outcome, the Physical 
Security Assessment Tool (PSATool), is a prototype application for performing checklist-based 
assessments of IDF physical security.  
 
Figure 1. PSATool sample data entry screen format 
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Figure 1 shows a fragment of a PSATool data entry screen. The tool lists 52 security 
requirements, compiled from NIST SP 800-53 (2009), NIST SP 800-53A (2010), and ISO/IEC 
27002 (2005). Tool users determine whether each requirement is met (TRUE) or unmet (FALSE) 
relative to a given IDF. The tool includes fields for additional comments on each requirement, 
along with a supplemental area for additional concerns related to overall threat, hazard, and 
vulnerability (THV) data and strategies for their possible mitigation.  
This data, once compiled, is entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet linked to a 
Microsoft Access database. The current prototype includes queries that generate aggregate 
analyses of the data. Additional queries are provided that allow IDFs to be ranked by number of 
passed or failed requirements. 
In fall 2012, PSATool was used to assess 135 IDF installations at East Tennessee State 
University (ETSU). ETSU is a regional university in northeast Tennessee with a current 
enrollment of more than 15,000 students. ETSU’s network is managed by ETSU's Office of 
Information Technology (OIT), with an operating budget, excluding salaries, of $186,030 for the 
2013-2014 year (ETSU, 2013). OIT supports the network access provided to each building, 
classroom, and office on campus, 53 computer labs containing 1,200 computers, and all 
residence hall rooms (OIT, 2013).  
The results of this assessment, in the view of the network's administrators, provided a 
realistic characterization of the IDFs' security. The assessment proper yielded 7,020 data points. 
A total of 95 threats, hazards, and vulnerabilities were discovered and various other concerns 
identified, including inaccessible IDFs located in hazardous environments, mislabeled and 
unidentified backup systems and power feeds, and unidentified IDF rooms. The mean and 
median number of passed requirements was 20 requirements. Newly constructed or recently 
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renovated IDF installations were found to pass more assessment requirements. Administrators 
also observed that the tool’s Traceability Matrix will provide justification for network equipment 
isolation and capital investment expenditure. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Overview 
Information security is defined by U.S. Code (2002) as “protecting information and 
information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or 
destruction”. This protection is intended to assure information integrity, confidentiality, and 
availability. Differing perspectives on what information security should entail have yielded a 
large, complex literature (Bishop, 2002). Information security considerations relevant to the 
current work include risk management, risk assessment, vulnerability assessment, standard 
practice, and legal compliance. Best practices for IDF security were derived from these 
considerations. 
Risk Management 
Decisions involving security control selection and resource allocation are burdened with 
risk (Soo Hoo, 2000). Risk in the context of security is often defined as an outcome or 
consequence of a threat together with the likelihood of its occurrence (Henley & Kumamoto, 
1996). Many organizations address risk using explicit strategies for guiding risk-related 
management decisions, a process known as risk management. Risk management processes are 
intended to identify a level of risk deemed organizationally acceptable and a plan for attaining 
that level. These processes may result in the removal, reduction, and reallocation of risk (Soo 
Hoo, 2000).  
Early research on risk management assumed the use of highly complex, quantified 
models of risk. These first-generation strategies are typified by Soo Hoo’s framework (2000), 
which combines probability theory; “influence diagrams”, a type of flowchart used to analyze 
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organizational issues that affect decision-making; and “decision analysis”, a procedure 
formalizing the analysis of making decisions and outcomes. This framework attempts to 
accurately quantify system risk while allowing for uncertainty and fluctuating levels of model 
detail. Soo Hoo argues that qualitative approaches are not a long term solution to information 
security. He suggests that organizations might follow the best practices offered by a standard 
blindly, without adaptation to the specific risks within an organization (Soo Hoo, 2000). 
However, the standards themselves advocate ongoing assessment of risk. 
Difficulties with quantitative approaches include their dependence on information that 
may be unavailable and questions about their effectiveness. Verendel (2009) surveyed 90 papers 
that comprised most of the work in information security quantification and modeling between 
1981 and 2008. Papers were assessed according to their degree of support for empirical testing, 
their use of assumptions based on empirical testing, and the amount of direct empirical testing 
performed in support of the proposed model. Verendel concludes that the effectiveness of 
quantification for managing operational security, or the security of a system in its actual 
environment, has not been demonstrated by empirical means (Verendel, 2009).  
The difficulties experienced in first-generation methods led to alternative strategies that 
sought to improve implementation, decrease complexity, and improve security. This second 
generation of methods includes scenario analysis, integrated business, value-driven and best 
practice methodologies.  
In scenario analysis, authorities identify and then analyze scenarios in which security and 
services are compromised. This can involve the use of an audit team to attempt the electronic or 
physical penetration of a system, together with an analysis of that attempt. Scenarios presenting 
the greatest risk are then used to develop a risk reduction plan (Soo Hoo, 2000).  
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The scenario analysis approach simplifies assessment. Different paths leading to the 
same asset may be ignored and scenarios with less risk may remain unevaluated or undiscovered. 
The types of threats and vulnerabilities anticipated by scenario analysis are limited to the 
creativity of the team involved (Soo Hoo, 2000). 
Value-driven methodologies focus on the economic impact of threats to subsets of assets, 
ignoring the probabilities associated with risk. Assets are first classified by relative value 
according to role and cost. A security specification is then developed for each asset class and 
security policies and safeguards are developed to satisfy these specifications. No mechanism for 
security system refinement or vulnerability assessment is provided (Soo Hoo, 2000).  
Integrated business risk-management methodologies treat information technology (IT) 
risk in the same manner as any business risk. Rather than focusing on the components of risk 
sources such as information, software, and hardware, the approach focuses on broad, non-
technical categories of risk such as financial risks, environmental risks and operating risks. 
Assessment is simplified in this approach as is analysis (Soo Hoo, 2000). 
Best practice methodologies address security and support system concerns by 
implementing a given industry's standard practices and policies. These best practices are usually 
defined as part of public standards, e.g., British Standard 7799. This methodology’s primary 
appeals are logistic and legal. Best practice methodologies avoid the need to perform intensive 
analysis, gather security-related information, and construct scenarios. Rather, they assume that 
an organization will be held harmless for implementing the same practices as the majority of an 
industry (Soo Hoo, 2000). 
Best practice methodologies are typified by Parker (2006), who advocates the use of 
accepted practices and standards to develop information security controls and establish a level of 
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due diligence. Due diligence is established by the continual application of a formal framework of 
security policies and procedures to an organization’s information infrastructure (Tittel, Chapple, 
& Stewart, 2004). Establishment of a level of due diligence as promoted by Parker is intended to 
defend against claims of negligence in the event of litigation. Legal compliance to mandated 
legislation, intended to reduce penalties and liability, is also stressed by Parker as a component 
of security. ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) supports legal compliance as advised by Parker.  
Parker (2006) advises that risk management approaches to information security offer no 
solutions to security control choices. He argues that security controls are ultimately selected 
based on due diligence regardless of the type of analysis involved. Stoneburner et al. (2002), 
Mattord (2007) and Al-Hamdani (2009) join Parker in support of standard-based security.  
Risk Assessment 
Risk management typically starts with risk assessment, a process used to discover, 
describe, and comprehend risk (Soo Hoo, 2000). A risk assessment is intended to “identify, 
prioritize, and estimate risk to organizational operations (i.e., mission, functions, image, and 
reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation, resulting from 
the operation and use of information systems” (NIST, 2011).  
NIST SP 800-30 (2011) divides risk assessment into three distinct phases. In the first, 
preparation phase, assessment scope, constraints and purpose are defined. Threat and 
vulnerability information sources are identified. Finally, risk models, used to establish key terms 
and risk factors, are defined. In the second, analysis phase, threats, vulnerabilities, likelihood, 
and outcomes are identified and analyzed. A list of prioritized information security risks is 
produced which is used to make risk-related decisions concerning security controls. The third 
and final maintenance phase includes ongoing monitoring and updating of identified risks. 
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Vulnerability Assessment 
Garcia (2006) defines vulnerabilities as exploitable weaknesses in the design, 
implementation, and operation of asset protection systems. Once exploited, vulnerabilities can 
result in the interruption of services and the theft and destruction of information and assets.  
Baker (2005) perceives vulnerability as driven by threats or hazards. Threats include 
deliberate, malicious attacks that can result in theft and destruction. Hazards involve accidental 
damage, often by environmental factors including floods and fires. 
The objective of vulnerability assessment (VA) is to discover, document, and report 
vulnerabilities in an asset protection and support system. The vulnerabilities discovered in an 
assessment can be used to harden systems against those vulnerabilities and to compare the 
relative vulnerability among multiple installations. This assessment of relative vulnerability may 
be used to justify and prioritize the allocation of funds and resources (Baker, 2005).  
Studies of vulnerability assessment and the anticipation of threats and hazards include 
DOE-related work by Garcia (2006), Whitehead, Potter, & O’Connor (2007), and Johnston et al. 
(2002). Related studies include guidance for VA in facilities housing critical infrastructure 
systems by Baker (2005); and recommendations for VA in federal buildings by Beshlin et al. 
(2003).  
Physical Protection Systems Vulnerability Assessment  
Garcia (2006) describes a highly quantified methodology for assessing the vulnerability 
of physical protection systems (PPS). This includes a thorough review of sensor types, 
construction practices, detection systems, and security forces as well as an examination of 
concerns related to the timing and ordering of these entities' interactions. Intrusion detection, 
delay, and response are quantified and analyzed, as are sensor and control performance. Garcia 
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indicates the usefulness of physical security checklists and surveys to establish equipment 
existence. She also advises that checklists do not accurately establish control effectiveness. 
Whitehead et al. (2007) recommend Garcia’s methodology. The authors propose a higher level 
approach to PPS design similar to Garcia's. PPS objectives are established by identifying a 
facility’s physical features, operations, and required level of protection. A comprehensive list of 
potential attackers, their tactics, and deployment speed should be compiled. Assets and potential 
targets should be inventoried and prioritized according to their importance. Operations, 
movements, or procedures vulnerable to attack should be identified. By assessing the risk of 
attack and gauging the loss incurred by an attack’s outcome, the required level of protection 
should be estimated (Whitehead et al., 2007). 
Attacks are usually detected with an alarm system that monitors sensors and reports 
alarm status through an interface for assessment by security personnel. Graphical interfaces are 
preferred as they can present more information for alarm assessment than other types of 
interfaces. Desirable characteristics of alarm systems include flexible expansion and fast 
reporting. Alarm communication cabling is vulnerable to attack; therefore, the alarm 
communication system must monitor the cabling's health (Whitehead et al., 2007). 
Active alarms may be assessed by using a video system for viewing and recording. 
Transmission and recording systems for video cameras must be protected to prevent their 
compromise via the introduction of false signals or their destruction. Integrated systems that 
incorporate alarm signals into the video system allow recording of alarm status for forensic 
purposes. Alarm status can also be used to initiate video recording. 
Intrusion sensors such as beam breakage, boundary penetration, and motion detection 
sensors may be placed on the outside or inside of a protected area or asset. PPS designers must 
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be aware of sensor operational characteristics, placement options, and defeat methods. 
Whitehead et al. (2007) propose that PPS effectiveness be determined through the 
analysis of attack paths, i.e., series of actions that can compromise the assets that a PPS protects. 
The authors equate a PPS's overall effectiveness with the vulnerability of its critical path, i.e., 
that path that has the highest probability of interruption. Factors affecting effectiveness include 
the likelihood of detection, asset value, path length, and the access delay that can be introduced. 
The identification of paths is fundamental to evaluating system effectiveness. Regardless of 
assessment method, the PPS should be revised to include the results of the effectiveness analysis. 
A cycle of PPS assessment and refinement using assessment results should be maintained 
(Whitehead, 2007). 
The Vulnerability Assessment Team  
The Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) of Los Alamos National Laboratories 
(LANL) has conducted vulnerability assessments for government agencies and the Nuclear 
Power industry. VAT has conducted assessments on over 200 security devices. Based on these 
experiences, Johnston et al. (2002) propose the following recommendations for conducting 
vulnerability assessments. 
Assessors and all levels of personnel should be encouraged to discover problems and 
potential solutions. Assessors must be free to consider any attack path or scenario. Each 
vulnerability discovered should be listed with detailed information such as the tools and time 
required to devise and conduct an attack. An attacker’s technical sophistication level, system 
knowledge level, and access level should be included in the report, along with a sample of any 
defeated or vulnerable sensors. Controls should be suggested for any vulnerability discovered 
(Johnston et al., 2002). 
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Network Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment 
Baker (2005) proposes a general methodology for assessing physical and cyber 
vulnerability in facilities housing critical infrastructure systems. The methodology is intended to 
scale to multiple installations, thus establishing a baseline for prioritizing improvements and 
allocating resources. Baker suggests employees, police organizations, and the FBI as sources of 
threat and hazard information. 
The starting point for Baker's methodology is a definition of a facility's mission. This 
definition is used to identify and document mission-related threats and hazards. Systems 
important to facility mission, mission support, and protective systems are identified and 
documented. A system interconnection diagram is developed to illustrate the interconnection of 
critical systems, demonstrating dependencies. The timing and ordering of system repair, spare 
parts, key personnel, emergency responders, and system changes are considered when 
determining the degree of dependency (Baker, 2005).  
 
Figure 2. Vulnerability Assessment Threat-System Matrix (adapted from Baker, 2005) 
Vulnerabilities are analyzed according to their potential individual or combined effects 
on facility mission. A color coded matrix of assets vs. vulnerabilities is used to depict the degree 
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of perceived vulnerability in asset-vulnerability pairings (see Figure 2). Diagrams illustrating 
possible failure scenarios, critical system dependencies, and combinatorial failure dependencies 
form this stage's output. Baker suggests that diagrams be developed into a fault tree to help 
analyze dependencies in complex systems. Potential vulnerabilities that affect multiple critical 
systems from a single location should be given a higher vulnerability rating. Prior security 
incidents and their associated vulnerability should be included in the assessment (Baker, 2005).  
FEMA Vulnerability Assessment  
Beshlin et al. (2003) recommend a Federal Emergency Management Association 
(FEMA) methodology for assessing vulnerability in federal buildings. The methodology consists 
of a quantitative assessment of each asset, threat and risk, followed by a qualitative vulnerability 
assessment for each high-risk asset/threat pair. The authors also offer many best-practice-based 
recommendations regarding building HVAC, lighting, and construction.  
Standard Practice 
Information security standards provide organizations with security controls and 
assessment recommendations based on common organizational practices. These standards 
address cyber, procedural, physical, and environmental aspects of information security. 
Comprehensive assessment methods are described by NIST standards, including the ISO/IEC 
27000-series and NIST SP 800-series of standards.  
ISO/IEC 27000-Series Information Security Management Standards 
The ISO/IEC 27000 standards for information security management are produced by a 
joint committee of the International Standards Organization and the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC). These standards are based on information security 
standard ISO/IEC 17999, itself derived from a British information security standard, BS 7799 
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(Calder & Watkins, 2008).  
Different 27000-series standards address different components of information security. 
The first two standards, ISO/IEC 27001 (2005) and ISO/IEC 27002 (2005), address security 
needs for Information Security Management Systems (ISMSes): holistic, integrated processes for 
managing the planning, implementation, and support of information security, including concerns 
related to system policies, procedures, and controls. ISO/IEC 27001 specifies a form for an 
ISMS. ISO/IEC 27002 specifies information security controls and techniques proper.  
ISO/IEC 27001 
ISO/IEC 27001 specifies the use of a plan-do-check-act (PDCA) model for structuring an 
ISMS. The plan stage is concerned with ISMS establishment. The do stage involves ISMS 
implementation and operation. The check stage involves ISMS monitoring and review. Finally, 
the act stage involves ISMS maintenance and improvement (Calder & Watkins, 2008). Each 
stage of the PDCA cycle acts as input to the next stage. The process is assumed to be ongoing 
and repetitive. 
Systematic ISMS implementation is supported by ISO/IEC 27001. ISO/IEC 27001 
provides guidelines for the initial planning stage through ongoing maintenance and audit phases. 
ISO/IEC 27001 requires an audit by a third party and certification. Monitoring is required to 
retain certification.  
Dey (2007) and Fernández-Medina et al. (2006) advocate the implementation of an ISMS 
framework based on the ISO 17799 and 27001 standards. The ISMS framework begins with the 
establishment of information security policy boundaries, the identification of the assets to 
protect, and the development of scopes of protection. A formal document should be drafted 
requiring proof that controls have been introduced.  
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Once initial controls are in place, security teams should be formed for system 
implementation, system audit, executive approval, and technical knowledge. Officers for each 
team should be designated. Policy and procedures for team operations and communications 
should be defined (Dey, 2007). 
Physical and informational assets requiring protection should be identified and then 
classified according to security status. Procedures regarding the proper use and disposal of assets 
in each security classification should be defined. After classification, security measures for 
specific assets should be developed. This stage's output should include a matrix illustrating the 
security measures for each asset (Dey, 2007).  
Human Resource Department recruitment processes for employees, vendors, and 
contractors should be refined to include security checks and non-disclosure agreements. Job 
descriptions along with leave, retirement, and resignation policies should be revised to include 
security provisions and the consequences for violating those terms (Dey, 2007).  
Physical security should include protection of computing equipment and necessary 
support services. Policies regarding the reporting of equipment failures and security breaches 
should be defined. Recovery and contingency plans should be developed to ensure rapid 
recovery from failures or breaches (Dey, 2007). 
Entry and access control should be instituted to restrict access to sensitive areas and 
information. All physical and electronic information access should be logged (Dey, 2007). 
Policies, responsibilities, and procedures regarding the operation, compliance, 
maintenance and acquisition of software and hardware should be established. Maintenance and 
auditing should be logged, allowing for verification of procedures (Dey, 2007). 
ISMS framework implementation should conclude with an audit, associated corrections, 
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and ISO certification. The Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) certifies 
auditors in the assessment of information systems (Dey, 2007).  
ISO/IEC 27001 also requires an ISMS to be audited at regular intervals with regard to 
processes, policies, procedures, and controls. The depth, coverage, and frequency of the audits 
are defined by the organization. The ISO/IEC 27000-series of standards offers no specific 
guidance for overall execution of an assessment. 
ISO/IEC 27002 
ISO/IEC 27002 provides detailed guidance on information security controls and 
techniques. These controls and techniques are intended to be used within the context of an ISMS. 
ISO/IEC 27002-specified controls include policies, procedures, and processes, systems, and 
devices necessary to mitigate risk associated with security; procedures related to asset 
management, human resources, operations management, access control, and incident 
management; and controls regarding legal and technical compliance.  
Section 9 of the ISO/IEC 27002 standard is devoted to physical and environmental 
security controls. Example controls include the construction of a solid perimeter to contain 
system hardware and the use of entry controls to restrict egress. Controls concerned with facility 
location and external threat protection are provided. Additional controls dictate equipment siting, 
utility support, and cabling protection (Calder & Watkins, 2008). 
NIST Security Controls 
All Federal Information Systems except those designated as national security systems 
must conform to a framework of standards and guidelines for controls for information security 
(NIST, 2009). This framework, established by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), is intended to promote compliance with the Federal Information Security 
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Management Act of 2002 (FISMA). It was developed for inclusion in an organizational risk 
management strategy focused on assuring legal compliance with FISMA. It is designed to help 
an organization establish a degree of due diligence and provide asset and operational security by 
providing a basis for security controls (NIST, 2009).  
The NIST framework assumes a six-step process for information systems risk 
management. In the first step, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB) 
199 (NIST, 2004) is used to determine an information system's security category. A security 
category of low, medium, or high is assigned to a system based on the potential mission impact 
of a security, confidentiality, integrity, or availability breach.  
In the second step, a set of security controls based on the system security category 
determined by FIPS PUB 199 (NIST, 2004) is selected from NIST 800-53 (2009). A risk 
assessment is conducted to further describe and define system vulnerability and to identify 
supplementary controls absent from the control set recommended by NIST 800-53. The security 
controls must be tailored for specific organizational needs according to scoping guidelines and 
then supplemented with those controls required to assure compliance to legal, federal, and 
institutional requirements. A control's required level of assurance is determined by the system 
impact level. Assurance requirements range from proper control function in low-impact systems 
to the establishment of measures for control effectiveness and improvement in high-impact 
systems. No preference is given regarding specific control technologies, e.g., keyed mechanical 
locks vs. electronic entry control. Ending the second step, the security plan is updated to include 
the security controls and assurance requirements (NIST, 2009). 
The third step of the process is to implement the specified control set. Prior to 
assessment, a security plan must be drafted and approved by organization officials (NIST, 2009).  
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In the fourth step, security controls are assessed using guidelines specified by NIST SP 
800-53A. Assessment is intended to determine security state, effectiveness, and vulnerability 
(NIST, 2009). 
System authorization, the fifth step, is addressed in NIST SP 800-37. Authorization is the 
official acceptance of system risk by organizational officials (NIST, 2009).  
The last step in the NIST risk management process involves system and control 
monitoring with the goal of continuous improvement. In the monitoring phase, breaches of 
information security, e.g., loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, can trigger an 
assessment of security category and security controls. New threats and changes in mission, 
configuration, and risk management strategy can trigger assessment (NIST, 2009). 
NIST SP 800-53 specifies cyber and physical security controls for organizational 
planning, policy, procedures, and training. Controls are graduated in that fewer controls are 
mandated for lower impact systems than for high impact systems. Controls implementation is 
prioritized to provide an ordering for implementation. The control set offered by NIST is very 
similar in organization and type to the ISO/IEC 27002 physical and environmental controls, 
because NIST SP 800-53A actively maps ISO/IEC controls and techniques. There are minor 
differences between the control sets (NIST, 2009).  
NIST Control Assessment 
NIST control assessment methodology is defined by NIST SP 800-53A (2010). The 
depth and coverage of assessment is proportional to mission risk. Assessment establishes 
evidence that controls are correctly implemented and properly operated. Assessment provides 
justification for spending capital and allocating resources. Compiling evidence by assessment is 
essential to building an assurance case: evidence in support of an assertion about a need for a 
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control.  
Assessments may be conducted by teams composed of any number of assessors. 
Assessors with varying technical experience should be chosen by organizational officials as part 
of an overall organizational risk management strategy. Potential assessors include individual and 
team assessors selected from internal or external sources. Diversity in assessor experience and 
technical ability is expected (NIST, 2010).  
A NIST assessment entails preparing for the assessment, developing a plan for 
assessment, conducting the assessment, and final reporting. Each of these four phases is 
described in detail by NIST SP 800-53A.  
In the initial, preparation phase, an organization undergoing assessment must notify the 
appropriate officials, define the assessment team, and establish the project milestones. This 
organization must assemble specifications, policies, procedures and other artifacts including 
security plans, architectural designs, and prior assessments for inspection by the assessment 
team. The assessment team must establish organizational contacts and obtain the assembled 
artifacts. An understanding of organizational functionality, mission, and procedures must be 
developed, and information system architecture and security controls examined (NIST, 2010).  
In the second, planning phase, the assessment team develops a security assessment plan. 
This plan outlines assessment objectives and the path by which they will be met. The 
assessment's scope is defined, identifying the set of controls to be assessed and the depth and 
coverage of the assessment (NIST, 2010).  
Each assessment procedure contains methods, i.e., operations that test, examine, and 
interview individual controls, individuals, and policies. Methods are performed on objects, i.e., 
the entities being assessed. Objects contain attributes such as depth and coverage that specify the 
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effort required for a method's evaluation. Procedures may be tailored to an organization based on 
the depth and coverage required by the organization to reduce risk. Supplemental assessment 
procedures for controls not defined in the standard and any additional assessment procedures 
necessary for added assurance must be developed (NIST, 2010). 
The assessment plan should include extended assessment procedures, i.e., additional 
assessment cases for verifying compliance with assurance requirements established in the 
security plan. The completed assessment plan must be reviewed for correctness, cost, and 
performance and then approved by organization officials (NIST, 2010).  
Organizations with greater impact risk levels are required to expend greater effort in 
assessment depth and coverage, thereby achieving higher levels of assurance. Assessment cases 
range from the existence of functional controls at all impact levels to the verification of 
maintenance records and functionality testing in high impact systems (NIST, 2010). 
In the third phase of a NIST assessment, the assessment is conducted according to the 
security assessment plan. During the assessment, a determination is made by applying methods 
to the objects specified in the assessment procedure. This determination must yield one of two 
values: an acceptable value of satisfied (S), or an unacceptable value of other than satisfied (O). 
Any unacceptable determinations are assessed for impact on information confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability. Assessor recommendations for vulnerability removal and corrective 
actions to controls are compiled into an initial draft of the security assessment report and 
presented to the system owner. The system owner may choose to correct issues prior to the final 
report. Any modified controls, policies or procedures should be reassessed prior to final report 
construction (NIST, 2010). 
The final security assessment report characterizes the assessed set of controls from the 
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assessment plan. It identifies the information system, gives assessment date and impact level, and 
includes the determination for each assessment procedure, specifying its methods and objects. 
Assessor comments, including weaknesses in implementation or process, along with 
recommendations for corrections or enhancement, are included. Delivery of the final assessment 
report completes the assessment process (NIST, 2010).  
Legal Compliance 
Parker (2006) advises legal and regulatory compliance as an essential component of 
information security. This includes compliance with two key federal standards for information 
assurance, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) requires publicly held organizations to provide 
assurances that their practices have not impaired their ability to report financial information. 
Standards that attempt to ensure compliance with SOX are published by the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) (AICPA, 2011). One such standard is the Statements 
on Standards for Attestation Engagements (SSAE), No. 16. Section 801 of SSAE No. 16 serves 
as guidance for evaluating and documenting internal and outsourced organizational service 
provider controls. SSAE No.16, Section 801 requires that assessments be reported by a 
practitioner, i.e., a Certified Public Accountant (CPA).  
SSAE No. 16, Section 801 defines controls as the policies and procedures planned, 
applied, and documented to reduce risk to financial reporting. Collectively, these controls are 
intended to reduce the risk of the inaccurate reporting of financial data. Outcomes that affect 
reporting include interruption of services and destruction of information. Information technology 
systems must be assessed due to the infrastructure and services they provide to financial 
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reporting activity (Knolmayer & Asprion, 2011). 
The assessor’s objective is to obtain assurance and report findings based on the criteria 
supplied by the organization that all of the descriptions and declarations it provided are accurate 
as of the date supplied in the type 1 report, or during the period specified in a type 2 report. In a 
type 2 report the auditor must also obtain assurance and report findings related to the controls' 
operation and the fulfillment of stated control objectives required to reduce risk. If an assessor 
discovers risk requiring additional controls, those controls are recommended and documented in 
the assessment report. 
SSAE No. 16, Section 801 provides no set of controls with which to compare existing 
controls or establish a baseline set of controls. Control selection must be obtained by a system 
owner from other sources. The standard or benchmark chosen by the system owner determines 
the criteria by which the assessor evaluates the system. The suitability of the criteria is also 
assessed  (AICPA, 2011).  
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) is a federal law requiring the establishment of 
controls for anticipated threats or hazards to the security of student customer information (1999). 
GLBA compliance is required by the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Tennessee Board of 
Regents (TBR), ETSU’s governing body. GLBA (1999) requires financial service providers to 
insure the confidentiality and security of customer financial records. They must protect against 
anticipated threats or hazards to customer information security or integrity. They must also 
prevent unauthorized access to customer financial information that might result in customer harm 
or inconvenience (TBR, 2003). GLBA requirements do not specify physical security controls. 
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Best Practices for IDF Security 
There is a lack of published research regarding IDF physical security. No prior work 
devoted exclusively to IDFs was found. Prior work exclusively devoted to MDFs includes 
Richards’ (1982) work regarding data center protection. This work does not readily scale to IDFs 
in that IDFs represent a more numerous and exposed installation. 
A characterization of an ideal IDF can be obtained by applying recommendations put 
forth by the information security standards, vulnerability assessment recommendations, and legal 
compliance considerations to IDFs. This ideal IDF consists of an enclosed interior area devoted 
exclusively to the protection of network equipment and associated support equipment, 
communication media, and power wiring (ISO/IEC, 2005 and NIST, 2009). Two pieces of 
information or identification should be required at the IDF for access, which should be 
authorized, monitored, and logged. No utilities, e.g., plumbing, electrical, or HVAC, should be 
housed in the IDF. Bulk media or supplies should not be stored in the IDF. Physical locations 
should be selected to avoid the possibility of flood or other hazard. No outward indications of 
their purpose should be given (ISO/IEC, 2005). 
Protection of IDF equipment and services must include utilities such as power, 
environmental, and backup systems (ISO/IEC, 2005 and NIST, 2009). Power and 
communication wiring should be separated to prevent interference (ISO/IEC, 2005). Power 
should be supplied by redundant feeds that are separated physically in order to prevent a single 
event from damaging both (Baker, 2005 and Beshlin et al., 2003). Remote disconnects should be 
present, so as to allow the disconnection of power and water supplies in the event of emergency, 
e.g., flood, without approaching network equipment (NIST, 2009). The IDF should have 
dedicated HVAC systems to monitor and maintain temperature and humidity (NIST, 2009). 
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Power backup systems should supply enough power to allow equipment shutdown or continued 
operation with HVAC support (ISO/IEC, 2005). These backup systems should be located 
separately from the equipment being served (Baker, 2005 and Beshlin et al., 2003).  
Lightning protection, including surge suppression and proper grounding, should be 
provided for the facility housing the IDF and equipment (ISO/IEC, 2005). Equipment should be 
grounded to a building grounding electrode, with surge suppression applied to incoming 
electrical power and communication cabling (ISO/IEC, 2005). The IDF should be shielded to 
prevent electronic eavesdropping. IDF cabling and equipment should be documented and 
identified (ISO/IEC, 2005). 
Additional operational support and security should be provided by various alarm and 
assessment systems. Intrusion and fire detection systems should be used in addition to systems 
used to detect utility loss (ISO/IEC, 2005). Fire protection should include a fire suppression 
system, e.g., sprinkler, and extinguisher (NIST, 2009). Depending on the emergency, these 
systems should alert organizational security and initiate response; this may include notification 
of emergency personnel, activation of emergency lighting, and initiation of video recording 
(NIST, 2009). Cameras should be used to evaluate alarms (NIST, 2009). 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Overview 
Information security typically focuses on cyber security. As a result, few tools exist for 
the assessment of physical security controls. This thesis sought to address this deficiency by 
creating a sound, practical, and effective tool for physical security assessment. Here, soundness 
is equated with adherence to existing standards for physical security assurance, practicality with 
the tool's usability and extensibility, and effectiveness with the tool's satisfactory performance in 
an actual assessment. 
Scope 
The assessment tool, hereafter referred to as PSATool, was intended as a prototype 
application for gauging an IDF's physical security relative to a characterization of an ideal IDF. 
Prior work has concentrated on MDF physical security control selection and assessment. While 
facilities commonly contain one MDF, the same facility can possess multiple IDFs. These IDFs 
expose a university network edge to vulnerability, threat, hazard, and risk.  
PSATool's design focused on concerns related to control selection and control existence. 
Various aspects of IDF security were excluded from consideration in order to reduce the time 
needed to conduct an assessment and reduce risk to the entities being assessed. Omissions 
include the analysis of fault trees, the effect of combined vulnerabilities, and the timing of repair 
and response concerns (Baker, 2005); the timeliness of attacker detection, attacker delay, and 
security response (Garcia, 2006); and the effect of detailed procedures and event triggers on 
physical security. Only simple event triggers have been considered for inclusion, e.g., the 
initiation of video recording once triggered by an intrusion alarm.  
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Other exclusions included practical constraints including capital cost and available space. 
Research focused exclusively on information security standards, VA recommendations, and legal 
compliance. In practice, political, financial, and structural aspects often affect the selection, 
implementation, and assessment of controls. These factors are not addressed in the standards. 
The PSATool aspired to characterize an ideal IDF, unconstrained by these factors.  
Soundness 
PSATool was intended to relate the physical security controls prescribed through its 
requirements to widely accepted, practice based standards and vulnerability assessment 
recommendations. PSATool’s assessment methodology was also based on the assessment 
recommendations and procedures found in these standards and recommendations.  
PSATool was not designed to provide an absolute measure of IDF physical security. 
Although the tool might be used to derive quantitative characterizations of IDF security, it was 
intended to support a qualitative approach to security as proposed by Parker (2006). This tool 
was intended to provide a system administrator with an image of IDF adherence to practice-
based physical security recommendations. It was also intended to provide ordinal ranking of IDF 
security so that a system administrator can compare IDF physical security relative to other 
system IDFs in order to prioritize individual and system improvement. Tool adherence to 
common practice, VA recommendations, and legal compliance was intended to support the 
justification of capital improvement. 
Coverage of Key Recommendations 
PSATool’s design sought to integrate recommendations from key standards and reports 
into a single, comprehensive set of guidelines for IDF security. The NIST SP 800-53 (2009), 
NIST SP 800-53A (2010), and ISO/IEC (2005) 27002 information security standards were 
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selected as the foundation of the physical security requirements. VA recommendations included 
Baker (2005), the author of a methodology for infrastructure vulnerability assessment and 
Federal Emergency Management Agency authors Beshlin et al. (2003). Additional literature by 
Department of Energy scientists Johnston & Garcia (2002), Whitehead et al. (2007), and Garcia 
(2006) was selected in an attempt to obtain additional requirements. DOE scientists were 
included because to their involvement in the atomic energy industry.  
In many cases, multiple sources proposed similar or identical recommendations for 
controls. For example, controls for integrating intrusion system and video surveillance as 
described by Garcia (2006) are included in the NIST (2009) SP 800-53 standard. These common 
controls include the usage and monitoring of entry control systems, alarm systems, and backup 
systems. Again, NIST SP 800-53 and ISO/IEC 27002 specify many of the physical security 
controls recommended by Garcia (2006) and Whitehead et al. (2007). Baker (2005) recommends 
many of the same physical security controls found in FEMA guidelines and information security 
standards. Beshlin et al. (2003) offer many of the same physical security controls regarding 
alarm, fire, communication, and monitoring systems found in the NIST and ISO/IEC standards. 
PSATool’s design sought to collapse these repeated recommendations into a single set of 
orthogonal recommendations that covered the original recommendations. 
Some controls are found exclusively in a NIST standard, an ISO/IEC standard or a VA 
recommendation. ISO/IEC 27002, for example, was the lone source for a requirement for 
obfuscating network component rooms. Similarly, the labeling and documentation of patch 
cables is advised exclusively by ISO/IEC 27002. 
The PSATool was also intended to support legal compliance. SOX, SSAE 16 and GLBA 
do not require specific controls. These laws do require the construction of controls for 
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anticipated threats, hazards, and vulnerabilities to organizational reporting structure. PSATool 
sought to promote GLBA compliance by providing a mechanism for promoting the discovery 
and recording the anticipation of threats, hazards, and vulnerabilities. This is in accordance with 
the recommendation by Johnston et al. (2002) that assessment teams be allowed to anticipate 
vulnerabilities and suggest mitigating controls.  
Procedural Soundness 
Design of the PSATool and its accompanying assessment aspired to be procedurally 
sound regarding assessment procedures. The primary standard selected for judging the tool's 
procedural soundness was NIST SP 800-53A, the U.S. government standard for non-security-
related information systems. SSAE No. 16, Section 801 provides detailed assessment methods; 
however, these methods are intended to be administered by an accounting professional. NIST SP 
800-53A, as described in chapter 2, prescribes a binary methodology for assessing compliance 
with best practices for physical security. By contrast, detailed assessment methods are not 
offered by ISO/IEC 27002 (2005).  
PSATool Practicality 
Design goals intended to assure PSATool's practicality focused on assuring its usability 
and extensibility. With regard to usability, the goal was to produce a tool that users with some 
knowledge of network equipment, a limited knowledge of computers and no knowledge of 
programming could use to conduct assessments. Built-in requirements for IDF security were 
intended to be simple, self-describing phrases stipulating the existence of a single physical 
security control. The assessment form was intended to be usable with little or no explanation. 
Additionally, the tool was to provide self-contained queries for generating reports on individual 
IDFs as well as overall IDF data. The tool was intended to be reusable; to support a process of 
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ongoing assessment, consisting of multiple, frequent, assessment events. The resulting 
assessment history is intended to support a claim of due diligence. 
With regard to extensibility, one goal was to design an application that a computing 
professional with a limited knowledge of Microsoft Access and Structured Query Language 
(SQL) could extend to produce additional and tailored queries. Meeting this goal would allow 
organizations that required additional database tables to do so with a modest amount of 
programming and no changes to the tool's underlying data model. A second goal was to allow 
users with limited computer skills to add, tailor, and evolve requirements for several reasons. 
These new requirements would be required to accommodate additional, site-specific 
requirements for IDF security, including controls based on anticipated threats, hazards, and 
vulnerabilities discovered in an assessment and requirements for operational testing. Additional 
requirements might also be necessary due to future standards, recommendations, and analyses of 
security incidents. Another concern was support for adding newly commissioned IDFs to the 
assessment.  
PSATool Effectiveness 
It was determined that a case study involving the main computer network for East State 
Tennessee University (ETSU) be used to demonstrate PSATool’s effectiveness. ETSU is a state-
supported university that awards degrees in over 100 undergraduate, graduate, and professional 
programs (ETSU, 2012). The ETSU computing infrastructure provides network access and 
services to ETSU workers, students, and faculty. These services are provided at offices, 
classrooms, dormitories, and laboratories across the main Johnson City campus. ETSU remote 
sites include facilities, classrooms, and offices at the Veterans Administration Mountain Home 
located in Johnson City and at facilities in Kingsport, Elizabethton, and Mountain City. 
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Telephone service at all ETSU locations is also serviced by ETSU's Office of Information 
Technology (OIT).  
This case study involved an initial evaluation of the tool, a meeting to plan assessment 
execution, and an expert review of the assessment. Review experts included ETSU OIT 
Associate Vice President and Chief Information Officer, Mark Bragg, and ETSU OIT Director of 
Telecom and Network, Beth Rutherford. These individuals were chosen as experts because of 
their direct involvement with OIT network installation, operation, and protection. 
Assessment was restricted to IDFs in the city of Johnson City, including IDFs at the 
ETSU main campus, Veterans Administration, sports facilities, and student apartments. To limit 
the extent of the research and risks to equipment, assessment was limited to determining the 
existence of control hardware or simple mechanisms. These mechanisms and processes are ones 
that only trigger an event, e.g., intrusion system initiation of video recording. ETSU (IDF) 
installations vary greatly. IDF port quantities differ significantly, due to the diverse set of 
buildings, facilities, and departments that require network services. The areas used to house IDFs 
also vary. IDF installations range from multiple switch installations with primary and backup 
systems supplying heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) located in a dedicated room 
to single switch installations with no primary or backup HVAC systems housed in a shared area. 
Most IDFs are installed in areas originally developed for other purposes, then adapted to host an 
IDF. 
ETSU was deemed to be a suitable candidate for a case study for several reasons. These 
reasons include the large number of IDFs, the variety of diverse facilities housing these IDFs, 
and the frequent use of impromptu areas conscripted to host IDFs. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Overview 
This research sought to produce a sound, practical, and effective prototype of an 
application for IDF physical security assessment. The extent to which the resulting application, 
PSATool, met these goals was assessed using a variety of means. PSATool's soundness was 
assessed by checking its security model against industry standards for device and environmental 
security. PSATool's practicality was assessed relative to best practices for assuring the usability 
and extensibility of software applications. Finally, PSATool's effectiveness was assessed by 
using it to assess IDFs that constitute a moderate-size university WAN. 
PSATool 
PSATool is a software prototype composed of two architectural components, a Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheet and a Microsoft Access database. A separate sheet within the spreadsheet 
contains an assessment form for each assessed IDF. The database provides persistent storage and 
retrieval for assessment results. These results include assessment metadata, e.g., discrete 
assessment number and assessor contact information.  
Assessors physically assess each IDF in the target system. This assessment is performed 
by completing an assessment form composed of a set of testable physical security requirements 
and a THV assessment. Assessors may enter requirement test results directly the assessment 
form using a computer. Alternatively, assessors may print a blank assessment form. In doing so, 
assessment data may be entered offline. No computer knowledge or skill is required of the 
assessor. Assessment data must be entered directly into the linked database tables. Assessment 
results may be generated by using the provided queries.  
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PSATool Assessment Form 
A sample of the assessment form is shown in Figure 3. A blank assessment form is 
available in Appendix A. A complete listing of the requirements is provided in Appendix B. 
 
Figure 3. PSATool Assessment Form sample 
The physical security assessment form provides fields for recording assessment date, 
team number, and IDF location. It lists 52 physical security requirements, each of which is 
determined to be met (TRUE) or unmet (FALSE) relative to a given IDF. A field entitled 
Description of Response is provided next to the requirement result field. Assessment teams are 
urged to use this field for any additional information necessary to describe a requirement's state 
or justify a response. 
The form and tool groups related requirements into subsets called control classes. The 
control class allows for the grouping of requirements into subsets to aid discussion and querying. 
Entry control, access monitoring, and power supply are typical control classes.  
NIST (2010) views assessment as information gathering. The Entry Control Type (ECT) 
control class groups information related to the type of entry control hardware used at an IDF. 
Because a transitional state may exist as an organization migrates to specific hardware, e.g., card 
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readers in lieu of mechanical locks, ECT requirements capture specific type information to aid 
the inventory of specific hardware. 
 
Figure 4. PSATool THV portion 
Assessors may use the portion of the assessment form shown in Figure 4 to record 
anticipated threat, hazard, and vulnerability (THV) concerns. Assessors are urged to provide an 
associated control for each anticipated THV in the area provided.  
The physical security requirement data acquired at each IDF is entered into an individual 
sheet within a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. THV results must be entered directly into the 
database tables. 
PSATool Database 
A Microsoft Access database is linked to the spreadsheet containing the assessment form 
data. Requirement’s tests results and changes made to the requirement’s tests in the spreadsheet 
are reflected in the database. Any discovered threats, hazards, and vulnerabilities, together with 
their associated control recommendations, must be entered manually into the appropriate 
database tables. The assessment date and its unique identifier must be added to the database 
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manually.  
The database uses relational tables to store all requirement test and THV assessment 
results. An identifying number is assigned to each discrete element of THV found, as many of 
these elements were found in multiple locations. Definitions of all THVs and requirements are 
stored and assigned a unique identifier. Additionally, these tables hold each IDF’s unique 
identifier, facility name and room number. The physical security requirement set and traceability 
matrix is stored; assessment team configuration and contact information is housed; and all 
guidance standard and reference details including the document name, author information, 
publication date, and applicable section is held. A diagram illustrating database tables is 
provided in Appendix E. A system Entity-Relationship (ER) diagram is given in Appendix F. 
PSATool may be used to conduct multiple assessments with multiple assessment teams. 
Each assessment should be assigned a unique identifier by a user directly modifying the database 
table. This identifier allows for multiple assessments to be stored. Likewise, unique identifiers 
are assigned to each assessment team, allowing multiple assessment teams in each assessment.  
Queries were constructed to provide aggregate and specific IDF results. Users simply select the 
desired report from a list of the available queries to obtain results. Results are provided in tabular 
format as shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. PSATool query results format 
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A detailed explanation of these queries is available in Appendix D. These queries include 
the following reports:  
1. Display all failed requirements. 
2. Display all passed requirements.  
3. Display IDFs that fail a specified requirement. 
4. Display IDFs that pass a specified requirement. 
5. Count and rank IDFs by failed requirements. 
6. Count and rank IDFs by passed requirements. 
7. Display IDFs with THV and controls. 
8. Display all guidance documents for a specific requirement. 
9. Display all IDFs with a specific THV ID. 
10. Display requirement test results for a specific IDF. 
11. Display negative requirement test results for a specific IDF. 
12. Display positive requirement test results for a specific IDF. 
13. Display all assessor information. 
14. Display the total number of IDFs that fail each requirement. 
15. Display the total number of IDFs that pass each requirement. 
16. Display IDFs that fail a specific control class. 
Results Soundness 
Physical Security Requirements 
PSATool was developed from multiple standards and recommendations. An explicit 
mapping of each requirement and THV component to its guiding reference is provided in the 
Traceability Matrix of Appendix C. Figure 6 shows a sample of this mapping. 
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Figure 6. Traceability Matrix sample 
Relevant information security standards include NIST SP 800-53 (2009), NIST SP 800-
53A (2010), and ISO/IEC (2005) 27002. These standards form the core of the physical security 
requirements. The tool’s scope was expanded beyond the information security domain by 
including supporting recommendations on physical security from Veterans Administration (VA) 
and Department of Energy literature. This includes Baker (2005), Beshlin et al. (2003), Johnston 
& Garcia (2002), Whitehead et al. (2007), and Garcia (2006). To support legal compliance, a 
THV assessment was included as a component of the tool.  
All physical and environmental security controls from NIST SP 800-53 and ISO 27002 
deemed applicable to the assessment of IDF installations were incorporated into PSATool’s 
security requirements. These requirements specify controls on how entry control systems, alarm 
systems, and backup systems are used and monitored. Requirements were developed for controls 
devoted to network component location and construction. Requirements describing temperature 
and humidity monitoring controls were developed. A requirement was elicited for controls 
designed to prevent electronic information signal leakage.  
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Some requirements were derived from controls found exclusively in the NIST or 
ISO/IEC standard. These include ISO/IEC 27002 guidelines for obfuscating network component 
rooms, labeling and documentation of patch cables, and NIST requirements for automated 
emergency water shutoff valves. If any controls found in a single standard were related directly 
to IDF protection, they elicited an associated requirement. 
Additional requirements were garnered from the domain of vulnerability assessment. 
Intrusion detection, video surveillance, and construction techniques are described in much 
greater depth in PPS vulnerability assessment literature than in the information security 
standards. A requirement for lighting that facilitates surveillance was added to the assessment 
tool based on recommendations by Whitehead et al. (2007), Beshlin et al. (2003) and Garcia 
(2006). A requirement was developed in accordance with the proposal by Beshlin et al. (2003) 
and Baker (2005) for the separation of redundant power supply paths and the separation of 
primary and backup system location.  
The Baker methodology recommends many of the same physical security controls found 
in FEMA guidelines and information security standards. A requirement was established for the 
use of prior security incidents as a basis for control development as proposed by Baker. This 
control is absent from the control sets offered by the NIST or ISO/IEC standards. Prior security 
incidents were requested for inclusion into the assessment tool. However, no prior security 
incidents were recommended or provided by ETSU for inclusion as requirements in the 
assessment using the tool. 
The inclusion of a threat, hazard, and vulnerability assessment was motivated by SSAE 
No. 16, Section 801 and GLBA. The former, SSAE No.16, Section 801 requires the development 
of controls intended to protect an organization’s reporting structure. The latter, GLBA, requires 
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controls for anticipated threats and hazards. This inclusion of an assessment section is in keeping 
with a recommendation by Johnston et al. (2002) to allow assessor creativity in the anticipation 
of threat, hazard, and vulnerability. An area has also been provided for detailed control 
suggestions offered by the assessment team with which to mitigate any discovered threat, hazard, 
and vulnerability. The THV assessment supports legal compliance by providing a mechanism by 
which threats, hazards, and vulnerabilities may be anticipated, and corresponding controls 
devised. 
Several control and VA recommendations were not used to craft requirements for various 
reasons. While they sacrifice completeness, these exclusions serve to reduce the time and risk 
incurred by assessment and to enhance the tool’s usability.  
In order to restrict the assessment tool and project assessment to relevant IDF physical 
security recommendations, recommendations related to the physically secure removal, disposal, 
and re-use of equipment, data, and software as advised by ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) were not used. 
No recommendations by ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) for facility delivery and loading areas’ physical 
security were used. No requirements were created from the recommendations by ISO/IEC 27002 
(2005) and NIST SP 800-53 (2009) for the physical security of output devices, including 
monitors and printers. 
In order to reduce the time needed to conduct an assessment and to reduce the risk to the 
entities being assessed, some recommendations were omitted. Omissions include the analysis of 
fault trees, the effect of combined vulnerabilities, and the timing of repair and response concerns 
(Baker, 2005); the timeliness of attacker detection, attacker delay, and security response (Garcia, 
2006); and the effect of detailed procedures and event triggers on physical security. Only simple 
event triggers have been considered for inclusion, e.g., the initiation of video recording once 
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triggered by an intrusion alarm. Requirements related to the operational testing of controls were 
not created.  
Assessment Procedure 
Like the assessment methods found in NIST SP 800-53A, the U.S. government standard 
for non-security-related information systems, PSATool assessment requirements elicit a binary 
result. Instead of the detailed assessment procedures found in NIST SP 800-53A, a set of 
physical security requirements was tested at each IDF. 
PSATool Practicality 
PSATool was designed to promote usability and extensibility, thereby increasing its 
practicality. The layout of the assessment form and the language used in the security 
requirements is self-describing. To assist this self-description, the assessment form contains 
instructions related to its proper completion, as shown in Figure 7. The assessment form is 
divided into two easily discernible sections, a requirement test and a THV assessment. 
Instructions on the assessment form guide assessors in the use of the THV assessment. The 
binary requirement test result is designed to elicit an unambiguous response from the assessor. 
Requirement structure follows the intentional sentence structure commonly used in software 
requirements engineering as promoted by Kandt (2003). 
 
Figure 7. PSATool completion instructions 
A user’s computer skill level determines the extent to which PSATool is usable and 
extensible. This includes users with no computer skills or limited computer skills, to computing 
professionals having programming knowledge.  
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Users with no computer skills may perform assessments using a printed assessment form. 
The use of assessors possessing varying skill sets and experiences to conduct vulnerability 
assessments is recommended by Johnston et al. (2002). Additionally, users with no computer 
skills may develop additional or tailored requirements by following the language structure found 
in the assessment physical security requirements (Kandt, 2003).  
Users possessing basic computer skills may display assessment results by using the 
provided queries. These queries require users to simply select a report and enter no more than 
one operand to obtain query results. These results provide network support personnel with 
detailed data useful for prioritization of physical security improvement. 
Users with intermediate computer skills can extend PSATool. They may add new and 
modified requirements into the assessment form, insert additional IDFs into an assessment, and 
insert data directly into the database tables. This modification may be performed by copying a 
row containing any requirement, then inserting this copied row into the appropriate control class. 
This duplicate row may then be modified to reflect the new requirement. The updated assessment 
form is then linked to the database. Intermediate skill users may also extend PSATool by adding 
IDFs to an assessment. This is performed by copying and inserting an additional blank 
assessment form into the PSATool spreadsheet, then linking this new sheet to the database. 
Intermediate skill users can insert assessment data directly to the database tables by locating and 
navigating to the appropriate table, then populating the appropriate cell. 
Users who can program in SQL can extend PSATool by constructing new queries, e.g., a 
new query that counts and ranks IDFs by number of THV elements. This user would also be able 
to tailor existing queries to suit organizational need. A programmer with knowledge of relational 
database theory can extend PSATool's data model by adding new tables or altering existing 
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tables. New table attributes could also be added or modified by this level of user. This change 
might be necessary if an additional persistent attribute were required, e.g., the addition of a field 
to record the date that a requirement was incorporated into the assessment form. 
Reusability is another practical feature of PSATool. The spreadsheet and database may 
be used to conduct multiple assessments, thereby developing a history of physical security 
assessment. While the date of an assessment is logged, assessments are assigned an identifier that 
indicates the assessment set to which an individual assessment belongs.  
PSATool Effectiveness 
An assessment team composed of George Peters, OIT Network Support Specialist, and 
Nathan Timbs, a graduate student, evaluated PSATool by using it to assess physical security at 
135 IDFs located on the ETSU campus in autumn 2012. A printed version of PSATool’s 
assessment form was used to evaluate 52 physical security requirements and complete the 
included threat, hazard, and vulnerability assessment by visually inspecting each IDF interior and 
exterior. These IDFs were evaluated during a span of 50 hours over a period of 6 weeks from 
mid-October through early December. Each assessment required an average time of roughly 22 
minutes. Some requirements tests were incomplete due to insufficient power and backup system 
labeling and documentation. As a result, the data collected at the IDFs was augmented with 
supplemental data in the form of facility generator information obtained from ETSU’s Facilities 
Department in January 2013. The requirements tests yielded 7,020 data points. The threat, 
hazard, and vulnerability assessment yielded 95 elements of THV. Controls were recommended 
for each element. All data garnered during the assessment was entered into PSATool during 
December 2012 and January 2013. Detailed assessment results and reports were provided to 
ETSU in late January 2013.  
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To protect ETSU’s security, the following discussion of the assessment’s results 
characterizes the findings in relatively broad terms. All characterizations of specific assessment 
results and vulnerabilities will be withheld until they have been addressed. All references to the 
identity and location of specific IDFs have been obfuscated.  
Assessment Data Collection 
The ETSU OIT network contains 158 IDFs located in Johnson City and surrounding 
areas. Johnson City locations include 147 IDFs. PSATool was used to audit 135 of the IDFs 
located in Johnson City.  
Approximately 100 assessments were successfully completed in the first attempt. The 
remaining locations required additional information and investigation regarding power supply 
and backup capability. Ultimately, all assessed IDFs yielded complete data sets. 
Three Johnson City campus IDFs were not assessed. The Reece Museum IDF was 
undergoing construction; therefore, any assessment would have been incomplete. One 
installation containing a single switch was not assessed due to difficulty in gaining equipment 
access. One installation slated for removal was not assessed. This installation has since been 
eliminated. 
Five types of obstacles were encountered during data collection. Nine Veterans 
Administration IDFs were not assessed due to their location. These IDFs were in buildings 
considered to be hazardous environments. Gaining authorized entry to these IDFs was therefore 
considered difficult. A recommendation to relocate these IDF’s to more easily accessible 
locations or separate sites with network cable being pulled to the locations with restricted access 
was offered to the system administrators in the final report and in the final meeting. 
Backup system capabilities were not clearly identified at each IDF. This lack of 
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identification increased assessment difficulty and decreased accuracy. Several IDF installations 
that appear to have backup systems had no visible indication of such, e.g., signage or labeling, of 
their backup capability. Only those IDF locations with a backup system located inside the IDF, 
or those with a visual indication of a backup system, e.g., uninterrupted power supply circuits 
designated with orange receptacles, met the requirements for a backup power supply. 
Additionally, the location of a generator on the immediate facility grounds capable of supplying 
power to the facility main power service produced a positive response for a long-term backup 
system. A recommendation for proper labeling was submitted in the final report. 
Generator information for various ETSU facilities was obtained from the Facilities 
Department. Facilities personnel did not know how well these generators would support their 
respective subgrids during an outage, including the resident IDFs. A recommendation for careful 
investigation followed by documentation was given in the final report. 
Inconsistent labeling of redundant power feeds increased assessment difficulty and 
decreased accuracy. Several IDF installations had parallel redundant power wiring that was 
unlabeled or ambiguously labeled. Only those IDF locations with clearly labeled and readily 
identifiable power feeds passed the requirements for physically separated redundant power feeds. 
A recommendation for careful investigation followed by documentation was given in the final 
report. 
Several IDFs had no room number. This lack of identification may impede location of the 
IDF by department personnel and emergency responders. A recommendation to label all 
unidentified rooms was supplied in the final report. 
Assessment Results Overview 
Assessed IDFs vary greatly in construction, protection, and location. Assessment results 
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reflect this variation.  
Figure 8 presents a graph displaying the total requirements passed at each IDF. At least 
10 requirements were passed by all IDFs. Five IDFs passed the most requirements, at 27. Newly 
constructed or recently renovated IDF installations passed more assessment requirements. The 
mean and median number of passed requirements was 20 requirements. Eleven IDFs passed at 
least half of the requirements. Almost all IDFs failed requirement 10, which was concerned with 
the labeling of IDF cables.  
Figure 8. Number of requirements passed per IDF 
Of 135 IDFs assessed, 82 IDFs exhibited a total of 95 threats, hazards, and 
vulnerabilities. Thirty-one distinct elements of THV were found. Nineteen IDFs were found to 
have no room number. This was considered to be hazardous to network operations due to the 
inability of service and emergency personnel to locate the IDF using the room number.  Eleven 
IDFs had no lighting. This was considered hazardous in that service personnel might 
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unintentionally endanger network operations by accident while maneuvering around in a dimly 
lit IDF. Nine IDFs had a vent located in the IDF door. This was considered vulnerability because 
the vent could be easily removed, thereby gaining unauthorized IDF access. Each THV element 
triggered a control recommendation by the assessment team. Some recommended controls 
covered multiple threats, hazards, and vulnerabilities. This overlap resulted in 26 distinct control 
recommendations. Appendix J contains the individual elements of discovered THV. Appendix K 
lists the control recommendations offered by the assessment team for each element of discovered 
THV. 
Data Reporting 
The five documents that comprise the detailed assessment results were provided to ETSU 
(OIT) in January of 2013. The assessment report Requirement Data Summary and THV Data 
Summary sections have been included in Appendices G and H, respectively. The assessment 
report Recommendations section has been included in Appendix I.  
In April 2013, a final meeting was held with ETSU (OIT) to review the assessment. 
Additional assessment results were collected as a result of this meeting concerning the validity, 
usefulness, and completeness of the assessment requirements. The meeting results are as follows: 
1. When ranked by requirements passed, IDF rank corresponded to the system 
owner’s estimation of IDF physical security, i.e., IDFs considered more secure by 
the system owner ranked higher. 
2. The Traceability Matrix provides justification for isolation of network equipment.  
3. The Traceability Matrix provides justification for capital investment. 
4. Assessment coverage and depth exceeded system owner expectation. 
5. All IDFs failed Requirement 10, which states that “cabling shall be identified to 
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minimize patching and handling errors”. ETSU (OIT) practice is to label ports 
rather than cables. It was recommended that this departure from requirements 
(and standard practice) be justified and documented as part of a system risk 
assessment. Once justified, Requirement 10 could be tailored to organizational 
practice to prefer the labeling of switch ports, e.g., “switch ports shall be 
identified to minimize patching and handling errors”. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
The goal of creating a sound, practical, and effective tool for physical security assessment 
was achieved. The goal of soundness was met by reviewing key standards of the information 
security domain and reviewing literature from the vulnerability assessment domain. The goal of 
practicality was met by demonstrating the relation between the standards and the information 
collected, while allowing for expansion through a THV assessment. The tool's effectiveness was 
demonstrated by validating its use in a university network setting.  
Assessment tool implementation provided an image of IDF state that corresponded to the 
system owner’s preconceived estimation of IDF state, i.e., IDFs that owners viewed as more 
physically secure met more requirements than IDFs that were viewed as less secure. When 
ranked by the number of passed requirements, rooms perceived by the system owner to be more 
physically secure ranked higher. Rooms expected to be less physically secure ranked lower. This 
correlation between assessment results and owner estimation of security attests to the tool's 
validity.  
The Traceability Matrix found in Appendix C addresses several system owner concerns. 
Encroachment of building utilities, hardware, and systems into space ideally relegated to network 
equipment is an increasing problem. In the system owner’s experience, building designers are 
concerned primarily with building codes. They are not typically concerned with information 
security standards and practices that attempt to provide a protected, dedicated space for network 
equipment as described by the comparison IDF. The Traceability Matrix provides standard and 
practice support for the system owner related to providing an isolated space for network 
equipment. Justification of capital expenditure is another owner concern. Unlike the comparison 
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IDF, system owners have limited funding with which to select controls. System owners must 
also justify security concerns and related control choices to administrative entities to secure 
funding. Through the use of PSATool’s Traceability Matrix, capital expenditure can be 
prioritized and justified based on practices, standards, and legislative support.  
When the system owner was asked how the assessment might be improved upon, no 
suggestions for improvement were offered. Assessment coverage and depth exceeded system 
owner expectation.  
Assessment requirements were developed with no prior knowledge of existing system 
controls; however, no existing system controls were found to be missing from assessment 
requirements, i.e., existing IDF controls were contained within the set of assessment 
requirements. This finding implies that assessment requirements were sufficient to assess 
existing controls. Additionally, this finding implies that all existing controls were deemed 
necessary for physical security, supporting the validation of the individual assessment 
requirements.  
Additional THV was discovered in several IDFs. This new THV could represent 
significant risk. It should be reviewed by system owners. If determined to be significant, this 
THV should be treated with appropriate controls. Any new controls should trigger new 
requirements for inclusion in future assessments. If the THV is deemed insignificant, 
justification as to its insignificance should be formally documented.  
Recommendations for Future Work 
Requirements for operational testing should be developed and incorporated into future 
assessments. Currently, PSATool’s requirements are limited to establishing that recommended 
controls are in place. These expanded requirements should increase testing depth. Increased 
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testing depth, however, will incur increased risk, i.e., a failed operational test may result in 
system and service failure.  
Requirements that specify these complex sequences of events should be developed as 
needed. Assessment tool requirements currently specify simple event triggers. Complex 
sequences of actions may be required to provide a proper alarm response. Complex action 
sequences triggered by system input constitute controls and should be tested by a formal 
requirement as such.  
Additional requirements should be developed that guarantee the evolution of 
requirements to meet current practice and conditions. Assessment tool requirements reflect 
current standards and practice. To adequately assess control choice, requirements must be based 
on current industry practices and environmental conditions. These requirements would require 
the use of the latest best-practice standards and vulnerability literature. Additional corollary 
requirements might trigger the review of foundation documents on a periodic basis. 
Requirements should be developed that stipulate ongoing, periodic assessment. These 
temporal requirements might be met only if an assessment has been performed within a specified 
time limit.  
The project assessment contains compound requirements. Unless specifying detailed 
sequences of action, compound requirements should be decomposed into simple requirements. 
For example, requirement 27 stipulates that “Fire detection shall be automatically activated and 
emergency responders automatically notified”. This requirement could be decomposed into two 
constituent requirements, one specifying automatically activated fire detection and another 
specifying the automated notification of emergency response personnel upon fire detection. 
Requirements should be developed for newly-discovered THV and related, recommended 
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controls reviewed by system owners. Ideally, the control suggestions collected by the THV 
assessment will result in new system controls and accompanying requirements. Additional table 
attributes might be required to log the incorporation date of new and modified requirements.  
Additional queries should be developed and tailored to suit organizational need. These 
queries might count and rank IDFs by the number of THV elements they possess. Future queries 
should exploit the ability of PSATool to store multiple assessments with multiple teams, 
allowing searches based on assessment date, assessment number, and team configuration.  
Summary 
Security assessments for computer networks, increasingly used as system infrastructure 
and service provider, primarily focus on cyber security. As a result, few tools exist for network 
physical security assessment. To help address this need, PSATool, a sound, practical, and 
effective physical security assessment tool was designed, implemented, and evaluated at ETSU, 
a regional university. This tool is devoted to the physical security assessment of IDFs. 
To promote soundness, PSATool was designed to support standard-based security as 
endorsed by Parker (2006). The tool is composed of a spreadsheet and linked database. The 
tool’s spreadsheet interface contains an assessment form with requirements developed from 
physical security controls used to mitigate risk provided in National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) SP 800-53 (2009), NIST SP 800-53A (2010) and International Standards 
Organization and the International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) 27002 (2005) 
information security standards. Additional requirements were derived from vulnerability 
assessment recommendations by Department of Energy scientists, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency authors, and vulnerability assessment authors. Legislative compliance was 
addressed with the inclusion of Tennessee Board of Regents guideline B-090 (2003) 
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requirements which stipulate Graham-Leach-Bliley Act compliance.  
To promote practicality, PSATool was designed to be easily used, extended, and reused. 
PSATool provides a spreadsheet interface for entering the requirements tests. Threat, hazard, and 
vulnerability (THV) data must be entered directly into the database. A printed version of the 
assessment form allows users with no computing skills to act as assessors. Users with basic skills 
can produce assessment results with the use of provided queries. Users with intermediate skills 
can extend PSATool by adding and modifying physical requirements; they can also add new 
IDFs to an assessment. Advanced users with programming knowledge can alter or add queries. 
These users can also modify PSATool’s data model by adding or altering tables. PSATool 
supports a program of ongoing assessments using multiple assessment teams. 
To demonstrate its effectiveness, PSATool was used at East Tennessee State University 
(ETSU) to assess physical security at 135 intermediate distribution frame (IDF) installations. 52 
physical security requirements were used to compare the existence of IDF network physical 
security controls to controls recommended by information security standards and vulnerability 
assessment recommendations. A threat, hazard, and vulnerability assessment was conducted at 
each IDF.  
Four types of obstacles were encountered during the assessment. Several Veterans 
Administration IDFs were not assessed due to access difficulty. This obstacle led to a 
recommendation for IDF relocation. Backup system capabilities were not identified at each IDF. 
This obstacle led to a recommendation for careful investigation and documentation of power 
sources. Facility and IDF generator capability was unknown by facilities personnel. This obstacle 
led to a recommendation for careful investigation and documentation. Inconsistent labeling 
decreased assessment accuracy. This obstacle led to a recommendation for proper labeling. 
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The assessment yielded 7,020 data points. The mean and median of passed requirements 
was 20. At least 10 requirements were passed by all IDFs. At least half of the requirements were 
passed by 11 IDFs. Five IDFs passed the most requirements, at 27. Almost all IDFs failed 
requirement 10. Eighty-two IDFs were found to contain 95 additional threats, hazards, and 
vulnerabilities. A control was recommended for each THV element discovered. Newly 
constructed or recently renovated IDF installations passed more requirements.  
Raw data, data analysis, and improvement recommendations based on assessment results 
were provided to the system owner in a report and database. The database provided queries that 
allowed the ranking of IDFs by quantity of passed or failed requirements. Additional queries 
allowed system owners to display all requirements passed or failed by a specific IDF. 
Conversely, all IDFs passing or failing a specific requirement could be displayed.  
Recommendations for improvement include the following: 
1. Perform a risk assessment to justify and document deviation (including supplementary 
and unneeded controls) from assessment requirements.  
2. Prioritize and implement any required controls specified by failed requirements.  
3. Label unidentified IDFs.  
4. Use redundant power feeds effectively.  
5. Label power feed sources.  
6. Perform operational testing to prove the existence and operation of backup systems.  
7. Install humidity monitoring sensors.  
8. Label backup system components.  
9. Install shunt trip hardware in locations where sprinklers could damage equipment or 
create a hazard for electrical shock.  
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10. Tailor the requirements in this assessment to ETSU practices.  
11. Perform an assessment with the tailored requirements.  
12. Make assessment a continuous procedure.  
A final assessment meeting was held to discuss assessment results and elicit additional 
feedback. System owners advised that when ranked according to the quantity of passed 
requirements, the relative rank of individual IDFs corresponded to their preconceived ideas of 
IDF physical security. This correlation between assessment results and system owner estimation 
of IDF physical security supports the tool's validity. System owners noted the usefulness of the 
Traceability Matrix in providing justification for isolation of network equipment. This result 
should provide defense against encroaching building systems into space allocated for network 
equipment. System owners noted the usefulness of the Traceability Matrix in justifying capital 
investment. This result should help system owners, faced with finite funding, prioritize and 
support specific control investment. Assessment coverage and depth was found to have exceeded 
system owner expectation. More controls were specified by requirements than were found in the 
assessed IDFs. Requirement 10 was examined for relevance to organizational practice. It was 
recommended that Requirement 10 be modified to reflect organizational practice after being 
justified and documented as part of a risk assessment.  
Future work based on this assessment includes the following recommendations: 
1. Develop requirements that specify operational testing and incorporate those 
requirements into future assessments.  
2. Develop requirements for controls that specify complex sequences of events. 
3. Develop requirements that guarantee that assessment requirements are based on 
current practice and conditions.  
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4. Develop requirements that stipulate ongoing, periodic assessment. 
5. Decompose compound requirements into simple requirements.  
6. Develop requirements to stipulate the controls recommended for newly-discovered 
THV be reviewed by system owners.  
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APPENDIX B 
Physical Security Requirements 
 
1. Entry control hardware shall exist to restrict entry at the IDF to authorized personnel. 
2. More than one form of identification or information shall be required to gain entry to 
the IDF. 
3. A mechanical lock and key assembly is installed as entry control hardware. 
4. An electronic keypad reader is installed as entry control hardware. 
5. An electronic keypad/card reader is installed as entry control hardware. 
6. An electronic card reader is installed as entry control hardware. 
7. A biometric device is installed as entry control hardware. 
8. Signal transmission media including line cabling, wiring, and fiber optics shall be 
protected from damage. 
9. Power wiring shall be segregated from communication wiring. 
10. Cabling shall be identified to minimize patching and handling errors. 
11. Patch and connection information shall be documented and available locally. 
12. No unauthorized devices or cabling shall be connected to cabling or equipment ports. 
13. Physical entry to the IDF shall be logged and monitored by organizational security. 
14. Organizational security shall monitor a dedicated IDF intrusion alarm system. 
15. The organization shall use camera surveillance systems at the IDF to assess intrusion 
alarms. 
16. An IDF intrusion system shall initiate response for physical intrusion alarms.  
17. Intrusion incidents shall trigger video recording at the IDF. 
18. Power equipment and cabling shall be protected from damage and destruction. 
19. Any parallel power supply paths provided shall be separated physically. 
20. Redundant parallel cabling paths shall be used to provide power to the IDF. 
21. A power service disconnect shall be provided with which to remove equipment power 
remotely.  
22. Any remote power service disconnect provided shall be protected from unapproved 
activation.  
23. Automatically activated emergency lighting shall be provided for emergency egress. 
24. Lighting shall be designed to assist surveillance using a camera system. 
25. A fire detection system shall be installed.  
26. A fire suppression system shall be installed.  
27. Fire detection shall be automatically activated and emergency responders 
automatically notified.  
28. Fire suppression shall be automatically activated and emergency responders 
automatically notified. 
29. A fire extinguisher shall be provided at the IDF. 
30. A dedicated HVAC system shall be used exclusively for IDF temperature control. 
31. Temperature shall be monitored and maintained within the IDF. 
32. Humidity shall be monitored and maintained within the IDF. 
33. Alarm systems shall be installed in the IDF to detect disruption in any supporting 
utility. 
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34. Water supply shutoff valves shall be provided in the event of water leakage adjacent 
to the IDF.  
35. Water supply shutoff valves shall be accessible. 
36. Automated water supply shutoff valves shall be provided to protect against adjacent 
area water leakage. 
37. The IDF shall be located above the first floor to minimize flood impact. 
38. Equipment shall be protected from HVAC utility disruption. 
39. A short-term uninterruptable power supply shall be provided for equipment 
shutdown. 
40. A long-term uninterruptable power supply shall be provided for continuous 
equipment operation. 
41. Any utility backup systems provided shall be located separately from the equipment 
to be served.  
42. The IDF shall have its purpose obscured, with no external indication as to use.  
43. The IDF shall be built in a solid and continuous manner with no gaps in construction. 
44. The IDF shall have no windows installed. 
45. The IDF shall have no drop ceiling installed. 
46. The IDF shall be located on a wall other than an exterior wall to minimize 
vulnerability. 
47. Facility utilities shall be located outside the IDF. 
48. Spare equipment including backup media and bulk supplies shall be stored outside the 
IDF. 
49. A grounding electrode shall bond the building structure and IDF equipment chassis to 
ground. 
50. Lightning protection shall be supplied to the incoming power.  
51. Lightning protection shall be supplied to the communication cabling. 
52. Electromagnetic shielding shall be used to reduce electromagnetic emanation. 
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APPENDIX C 
Traceability Matrix 
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APPENDIX D 
Database Queries 
1. Display all failed requirements. 
This query displays all failed requirements ordered alphabetically by the facility 
name. 
2. Display all passed requirements.  
This query displays all passed requirements ordered alphabetically by the facility 
name. 
3. Display IDFs which fail a specified requirement. 
This query displays all IDFs that failed a requirement specified by the user. 
4. Display IDFs which pass a specified requirement. 
This query displays all IDFs that passed a requirement specified by the user. 
5. Count and rank IDFs by failed requirements. 
This query ranks the IDFs by the number of failed requirements. The number of 
failed requirements is displayed. 
6. Count and rank IDFs by passed requirements. 
This query ranks the IDFs by the number of passed requirements. The number of 
passed requirements is displayed. 
7. Display IDFs with THV and controls. 
This query displays IDFs with additional threats, hazards, and vulnerabilities and 
their recommended controls ordered by facility name. 
8. Display all guidance documents for a specific requirement. 
This query displays all guidance documents for a requirement specified by the user. 
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9. Display all IDFs with a specific THV ID. 
This query displays all IDFs that contain a THV ID specified by the user. 
10. Display requirement test results for a specific IDF. 
This query displays all requirement test results for an IDF specified by the user. 
11. Display negative requirement test results for a specific IDF. 
This query displays all negative requirement test results for an IDF specified by the 
user. 
12. Display positive requirement test results for a specific IDF. 
This query displays all positive requirement test results for an IDF specified by the 
user. 
13. Display all assessor information. 
This query displays all assessor information. 
14. Display the total number of IDFs that fail each requirement. 
This query counts and displays the total number of IDFs passing each requirement, 
ordered by requirement. 
15. Display the total number of IDFs that pass each requirement. 
This query counts and displays the total number of IDFs passing each requirement, 
ordered by requirement. 
16. Display IDFs that fail a specific control class. 
This query displays all IDFs which have failed a requirement in the control class 
specified by the user. 
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APPENDIX E 
Database Table Diagram 
 
 
  
IDF
ID FacilityName Room 
Number Text Text
Required Required Required
Unique IDF Number Facility in which IDF is housed Room where IDF is housed 
REQASSESSMENT
IDF fk to IDF.ID ReqNum  fk to REQUIREMENT.ID AssessNum AssessDate TeamNum fk to TEAM.TeamID ReqResult
Number Number Number Text Number Text
Required Required Required Required Required Required
Unique IDF Number Requirement Number Assessment Number Assessment Date Team Number Requirement Test Result
THVASSESSMENT
IDF fk to IDF.ID THV fk to THV.ID Control fk to Control.ID AssessNum AssessDate TeamNum fk to TEAM.TeamID
Number Number Number Number Text Number
Required Required Required Required Required Required
Unique IDF Number Unique THV Number Unique Control Number Assessment Number Assessment Date Team Number
THV
ID Definition
Number Text
Required Required
Unique THV Number THV Definition
CONTROL
ID Definition
Number Text
Required Required
Unique Control Number Control Definition
REQUIREMENT
ID Definition ControlClass
Number Text Text
Required Required Required
Unique Requirement Number Requirement Definition Control Class
TEAM
TeamID AssessorID fk to ASSESSORS.AssessorID AssessmentNum
Number Number Number
Required Required Required
Unique Team Number Assessor ID Assessment Number
ASSESSORS
AssessorID HomePhone CellPhone EmailAddr Given Middle Surname Role
Number Text Text Text Text Text Text Text
Required Null Accepted Null Accepted Null Accepted Required Null Accepted Required Required
Unique Assessor Number Home Phone Number Cell Phone Number Assessor Email Address Given Name Middle Name Last Name Assessor Role
TRACEABILITY
ReqNumber  fk to REQUIREMENT.ID GuidNum fk to GUIDANCE. ID
Number Number
Required Required
Requirement Number Guidance Number
GUIDANCE
ID Publisher Document RelevantSection Authors Year
Number Text Text Text Text Number
Required Required Required Null Accepted Null Accepted Required
Unique Guidance Number Guidance Publisher Document Name Relevant Section Author Names Year Published
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APPENDIX F 
PSATool Database Entity-Relationship Diagram  
 
IDF
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ReqResult AssessNum
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ID
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1,*
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EmailAddr
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Publisher
Authors
Year
ID
Definition
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1,1
1,*
ID
Definition
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APPENDIX G 
Requirement Data Summary 
An overview of assessment results is described below. Results have been organized into 
the control classes found in the assessment tool then summarized.  
The Entry Control control classes list requirements for IDF entry control systems. An 
entry control system is required to restrict IDF physical access to authorized personnel. Guidance 
documents show no preference for the specific entry control technology used; e.g., lock and key 
assemblies are not preferred over biometrics.  
No entry control system is installed in several IDFs. These unprotected IDFs are located 
in a particular type of IDF. Two or more pieces of information or identification to gain entry are 
advised by NIST (2009) and ISO/IEC (2005). This control exists in IDF located at various 
locations. 
The Entry Control Type control classes list requirements for specific hardware type 
information. ETSU IDFs use mechanical lock and key assemblies exclusively to restrict access. 
If multiple types of entry control hardware existed, these requirements would be used to 
inventory the quantities of each type. 
The Transmission Media control class lists requirements for protecting, identifying, and 
installing communication wiring. Communication wiring susceptible to damage from electrical 
conduits without grommets, wall penetrations without sleeves, or ceiling grids without sleeves 
can be found at multiple IDFs. One IDF failed the requirement for separation of communication 
and power wiring. Its communication wiring was installed along long parallel incoming power 
feeds, increasing the possibility of electrical noise introduction through induction. 
ISO/IEC (2005) recommends the identification and documentation of communication 
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cables to prevent misconnection. ETSU practice is to label switch ports and patch panels instead 
of cables. Because the ISO/TEC requirement explicitly states that the cabling shall be labeled, no 
IDFs passed the requirement for labeled cabling. However, a change in this requirement might be 
justified using risk assessment, then the requirement evolved to the ETSU practice of labeling 
ports instead of cables. All IDFs passed the requirement for locally available connection 
documentation because documentation of network connection information is provided online to 
network technicians. 
No unauthorized devices were found connected to any IDF switches. ETSU disables 
unused ports to discourage the connection of unauthorized devices. This practice lessens the 
possibility that an intruder can interface with a port to gain network access undetected, as 
network access would require disconnecting an authorized connection.  
The Access Monitoring control class lists requirements for distributing, observing, 
recording, and assessing IDF intrusion detection and entry control systems. Intrusion detection or 
entry control systems are not installed at multiple IDFs. Without intrusion detection, assessment 
requirements for alarm triggered video recording and camera assisted alarm assessment failed for 
multiple IDFs. Without entry control systems, the requirement for security personnel to monitor 
and log IDF entry through the use of electronic entry control systems failed in multiple instances.  
The Power Supply control class lists requirements for installing, protecting and 
disconnecting IDF power supply circuits. ETSU power circuits are well protected from 
mechanical damage, with multiple IDF locations having power circuits susceptible to damage. 
Redundant power supplies were installed at multiple IDFs; of those, several had separated cable 
paths. 
A remote means of power disconnection is recommended by NIST (2010) for emergency 
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use to allow authorized personnel to disconnect power remotely without requiring them to 
approach equipment, e.g., a service disconnect located near the IDF door. A power disconnection 
means of this type is installed at several locations. 
The Emergency Lighting control class requirements mandate the automatic activation of 
IDF lighting to assist emergency egress. Lighting should also be designed to assist camera 
surveillance. These types of lighting are not found at multiple assessed IDFs. 
The Fire Protection control class lists requirements for installing fire detection, 
suppression, and notification equipment. All ETSU fire protection systems are assumed to be 
monitored systems with automated emergency responder notification. Fire detection and 
suppression is installed at multiple IDFs. Fire detection is installed at multiple IDFs, while 
multiple IDFs have fire suppression installed. Fire extinguishers are installed at multiple IDFs.  
The Environmental Protection control class lists requirements for installing, observing, 
and operating HVAC systems. Alarm systems are recommended to detect and signal the loss of 
utilities and systems that support an IDF. No sensors are installed in multiple IDF support 
systems or utilities. ETSU uses switches with temperature sensors to monitor the temperature at 
the IDF.  
The HVAC systems installed at IDFs vary. Several IDFs lacked HVAC systems. 
Dedicated systems are found in multiple IDFs. Facility HVAC supplies provide temperature 
control at several IDFs.  
Air conditioning equipment removes humidity from the air. Humidity may be added by 
installing separate humidification equipment. None of the systems at ETSU were observed to 
contain hardware capable of monitoring and maintaining a specified humidity. Thus the 
requirement to maintain and monitor equipment was failed by several IDFs without a 
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dehumidification system, devoted exclusively to humidity control. 
The Flood Protection control class lists requirements for flood related controls. Control 
valves are specified for piping systems located near an IDF. Manual valves or automated valves 
to shut off adjacent water supply or plumbing were not found at several assessed IDFs. Ground 
floor installations are found at multiple IDFs. These ground-floor locations can be more 
susceptible to flood.  
The Backup System control class lists requirements for electrical and HVAC backup 
systems. The required redundant or backup HVAC systems are found at several IDFs. Short-term 
backup systems for equipment shutdown are found at multiple IDFs. Long-term generator power 
supplies are provided at several IDFs. The separation of primary and backup equipment is 
recommended by Baker (2005) and Beshlin et al. (2003). A battery backup system may be found 
in close proximity to the supported IDF equipment at several IDFs.  
The IDF Construction control class lists requirements for constructing, locating, and 
obfuscating the enclosure that houses the IDF. Several IDFs have incomplete or nonexistent 
structures for containing and isolating IDF equipment. Windows are present in multiple IDFs. 
Drop ceilings are present in some IDFs. Exterior wall installations, which can be susceptible to 
hazard or blast damage, are found at several IDFs. Extraneous equipment, piping, or systems 
unrelated to IDF operation are found in many IDFs. ISO/IEC (2005) recommends the 
obfuscation of equipment areas. Signage that could indicate an IDF's purpose exists at several 
locations.  
The General Vulnerability control class contains a single requirement stipulating that no 
bulk supplies should be stored in the IDF. Only equipment and supplies related to network 
operation should be stored in equipment rooms. Such equipment and supplies were found at 
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several locations.  
ISO/IEC (2005) recommends electrical surge and lightning protection to include 
electrical grounding of the building structure, surge suppression on incoming power, and surge 
suppression on communication cabling. The Surge Protection control class lists requirements for 
lightning protection and surge suppression. Grounded equipment racks bonded to the building 
grounding electrode exist at multiple installations. Surge suppression is applied to incoming 
power at multiple IDFs. The requirement for surge suppression to be used on communication 
cabling failed multiple times. 
The Electronic Emanation control class contains a single requirement which stipulates 
that an IDF shall be protected from electronic eavesdropping by the use of shielding. The 
requirement for shielding failed multiple times. 
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APPENDIX H 
THV Data Summary 
Threats, hazards, and vulnerabilities not covered explicitly by the physical security 
requirements were found in several IDFs. These THVs range from IDF doors that were found to 
be propped open to light switches that were located on an opposite wall from the IDF entrance. 
THV is also detailed in the assessment database, ETSU Physical Security Database.accdb. All 
THV information may be accessed through the use of database Query 7. Controls have been 
recommended for each instance of THV.  
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APPENDIX I 
Assessment Recommendations 
The following recommendations for hardware and system assessment are based on the 
assessment recommendations found in the requirement guidance literature. 
1. Perform a risk assessment. NIST (2009) and ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) promote the use of 
risk assessment to formalize and document control selection based on institutional need. 
Deviations from assessment requirements should be justified and commented. Controls 
for the THV presented by this assessment should be evaluated and deviation documented. 
Document any required supplementary controls and unneeded recommended controls in 
the risk assessment.  
2. Prioritize and implement controls for failed requirements. Risk assessment should 
determine the required controls and implementation priorities. 
3. Label unidentified rooms. Several IDFs had no room number. This lack of identification 
may impede location of the IDF by department personnel and emergency responders.  
4. Use redundant power feeds effectively. Several IDFs have redundant power feeds that do 
not take advantage of the redundant feed.  
5. Label power feed sources. Visual indication, e.g., signage or labels, that denote the 
supply circuit breaker on the receptacle or power strip, would clarify a feed's power 
source so that a redundant supply may be used effectively, or that a single supply may be 
known as such.  
6. Do operational testing to prove the existence and operation of backup systems. Systems 
should be labeled appropriately with testing results. 
7. Install humidity monitoring sensors. ETSU uses switches that monitor temperature but 
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not humidity. NIST and ISO/IEC recommendations advise that humidity and temperature 
be monitored and maintained within a range defined by the system owner. 
8. Label backup system components. Because no operational testing was conducted in this 
assessment, the documentation and labeling of system elements increases in importance. 
Searching for proof that a system contains a backup system without operational testing 
requires investigation of the wiring and connected equipment. A system may be 
embellished with multiple backup systems, redundant power feeds, and remote utility 
disconnects. If these system elements are not labeled as such, they are not easily assessed 
or inventoried. 
9. Install shunt trip hardware in locations where sprinklers could damage equipment or 
create a hazard for electrical shock. IDF sprinklers are typically located above network 
equipment. The installation of a shunt trip switch to disconnect network equipment from 
electrical supply power upon activation of the sprinkler system or remote signal will 
lessen the chance of electrical shock and equipment damage. 
10. Tailor the requirements in this assessment to ETSU practices. The requirements used in 
this assessment were designed with no prior knowledge of ETSU hardware or practices. 
Document the reasons for deviation from established standards and practices. 
11. Perform an assessment with the tailored requirements. Tailored assessment requirements 
should produce a more meaningful assessment. 
12. Make assessment a continuous procedure. Incorporate assessment results into the next 
requirement evolution and assessment. 
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APPENDIX J 
Discovered Threats, Hazards, and Vulnerabilities 
ID THV Definition 
1 Equipment is visible through window. 
2 No room number on door. This is potential impedance to emergency personnel. 
3 No lighting installed in IDF. 
4 Enclosure requires ladder for access. 
5 A louver is installed in the door. There is concern that the louver could be used as entry. The 
louver also decreases HVAC efficiency. 
6 This IDF is in a high traffic area. 
7 A spigot is located on the sprinkler system in IDF. 
8 IDF room has no ventilation and is therefore very warm. 
9 Ongoing construction in adjacent area. 
10 Inside unit is located directly above equipment rack. There is a concern that the condensate 
drain could block, causing condensate to build up and release onto equipment. 
11 Drawing on Internet of building. This drawing shows a room labeled "Communic.". 
12 Switch and network components are housed on wall in telecommunications room with no 
enclosure. 
13 IDF is in a shared area. 
14 This IDF is located inside of a restroom. Flooding is a possible hazard. 
15 Light switch is located behind equipment rack opposite room entrance requiring walking 
through unlit room to activate switch. 
16 The sprinkler is located above the rack gear. 
17 No blinds on window. Sunlight entering the IDF through the window decreases HVAC 
efficiency and increases component visibility. 
18 Plumbing located above equipment. 
19 IDF Door propped open. 
20 Redundant power systems are provided, but not used. 
21 The IDF room is used as an HVAC plenum. The HVAC unit is located directly above the 
switching equipment rack. The filters will require changing, endangering switches and 
cabling.  
22 A bushing is missing on a conduit in IDF. This could cause wear on wire jacket. 
23 Lighting insufficient. 
24 This switch is housed in a lockable rack enclosure in a room housing utilities serving the 
Minidome. Room exists for a separate room to house the IDF. 
25 A map at the building stairwell identifies the IDF as room X-XXXCOMM. There is concern 
that this identification may betray its use as a communications room. 
26 The designation for this room is X-XXXCOMM. There is concern that the "COMM" 
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ID THV Definition 
designation may betray its use as a communication center.  
27 This area provides roof access. 
28 Visible signs of previous flooding. 
29 There is a flood risk due to location. 
30 A cover is missing from a communication wiring conduit outside of the IDF. Wire is exposed. 
31 A ladder is required to access rack. 
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APPENDIX K 
Recommended Controls for Threats, Hazards, and Vulnerabilities 
ID Recommended THV Control Definition 
1 Cover window with blinds or otherwise obscure window. 
2 Number Door. 
3 Install lighting. 
4 Install dedicated space and lower rack. 
5 Cover louver or replace door. 
6 Enclose IDF area. 
7 Provide an appropriate outside drain on sprinkler system. 
8 Increase AC supply or install dedicated system. 
9 Advise contractors of OIT emergency contact information in case of emergency. 
10 Place a pan under the inside unit evaporation coils to collect and deposit condensate to a 
drain. Alternatively, move inside unit to a different location. 
11 Obscure drawing on Internet. 
12 Segregate IDF in dedicated area. 
13 Segregate IDF in dedicated area. 
14 Relocate restroom entry door wall approximately 5 feet will relocate the IDF outside of the 
restroom and decrease the probability of flood hazard. 
15 Relocate light switch closer to door. 
16 Install a shunt trip switch to remove power upon sprinkler activation or flood. 
17 Install blinds or cover window. 
18 Install drip pan. 
19 A supervisory entry control system could have alarmed on the door being held open. Install 
monitored entry control. 
20 Install additional power strip to take advantage of redundant feed. 
21 Relocate HVAC unit or move the filter housing to the outside of the IDF wall. 
22 Replace bushing. 
23 Install lighting. 
24 Enclose IDF area. 
25 Change room designation such that no indication of usage is given, e.g. X-XXXA. 
26 Change room designation such that no indication of usage is given, e.g. X-XXXA. 
27 Enclose IDF area. 
28 Install drip pan. 
29 Enclose IDF area. 
30 Replace cover. 
31 Move rack to a lower position in a dedicated space. 
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